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Book Review
Rationality in Action, by John R. Searle. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001, 303 pp., Index. ISBN: 0-
262-19463-5, paper $16.95, cloth $35.00.
John Searle’s Rationality in Action is an ambitious addition to his prolific career. In this book, he
attempts to formulate and defend connected positions on free will, rationality, moral psychology, and
metaethics. The connecting themes are his views of what it is for something to be a reason for action,
and what human actions consist in.
In discussing reasons for action, Searle identifies what he calls ‘the gap’. He uses this term to refer
to three gaps. His third chapter, ‘The Gap: Of Time and the Self’ identifies three gaps which get
subsumed under the singular term. First, Searle tells us, there is a gap between deliberation and the
formation of an intention to take a particular action. This issue gets put on hold and is treated at
length in the ninth chapter, ‘Why There Is No Deductive Logic of Practical Reason’. The second
gap falls between the formation of an intention and the actual carrying out of that action. So, it
seems, someone can form an intention to carry out the trash and then fail to do so. Finally, the third
gap is between the initiation of an action, or any part of carrying it out, and the subsequent actions
required to complete the action. Someone may go to where the trash bin is, collect the trash, and
then decide not to move the trash to its designated location.
Searle says that his goals with respect to the gap(s) are to show that he has gotten the
phenomenology of action right, and that this phenomenology is a necessary feature of our mental
life. Searle’s arguments proceed in general by describing scenarios in which we act without
consciously ‘making a decision’, and finding intuitive tension. One such argument is as follows:
[There] is a kind of practical inconsistency in maintaining the following two theses:
1. I am now trying to make up my mind whom to vote for in the next election.
2. I take the existing psychological causes operating on me right now to be causally sufficient
to determine whom I am going to vote for.
The inconsistency comes out in the fact that if I really believe (2), then there seems to be no
point in making the effort involved in (1). The situation would be like taking a pill that I am
sure will cure my headache by itself, and then trying to add some further psychological effort
to the effects of the pill. If I really believe the pill is enough, then the rational thing to do is
sit back and let it take effect. (72)
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/abramsonrev.html[9/18/2009 5:06:07 PM]
Since compatibilists are the ultimate target of the arguments for the gap, it is worth rehearsing what
their response would be. I can believe that the psychological causes operating on me are sufficient
to determine whom I am going to vote for. At the same time, I can believe that I won’t find out
who I am going to vote for, and in fact won’t end up voting for anyone at all, unless I go through
the trying process of deliberation. To make the point more general, consider Rawlsian arguments
that athletic or intellectual achievements that come as a result of considerable personal effort do not
morally warrant reward. After all, such athletes or scholars simply were blessed with the conditions
in which such concentration and devotion were psychologically possible. We can (and Rawls does)
hold that we can nevertheless justify rewards since they make it more likely that people will put in
the effort required to reach lofty goals. Similarly, we need not agree with Searle’s claim of a
‘practical inconsistency’ between phenomenological claim (1) and psychological claim (2). In any
case, Searle takes considerable care to offer his own take on why we must be psychological
incompatibilists – free human action is incompatible with psychological determinism.
The final chapter of Rationality brings the reader to familiar Searlian territory to discuss the
implications of the gap. Namely, Searle muses on the relationship between our intuitions, and the
connection between mind and brain. In ‘Consciousness, Free Action, and the Brain’ Searle argues
for a disjunctive conclusion. Either we are subject to a constant illusion, that there are gaps when in
fact decisions flow from antecedently sufficient causes; or, the gaps we can (and must) perceive in
at least most of our voluntary actions are matched by a neurobiological indeterminism. By
mentioning a couple of results in brain and behavior studies, one old and one new, Searle comes to
the position that the latter case is an empirical possibility. Searle’s arguments on free will will be of
interest to libertarians and agent causation theorists. It is unfortunate, though, that he does not tie
his comments to the copious existing literature on these subjects.
Embedded within this book is a distinctly neo-Kantian project. Searle attempts to ground the
beginning of a moral theory within ‘the structure of language itself’. People are language users, and
simply by virtue of this fact, Searle attempts to show that they are strong altruists. In his words, a
strong altruist is someone who “…recognizes that there are rationally binding desire-independent
reasons for him to act in the interests of others” (158). The Kantian flavor appears in Searle’s
understanding of language use as a necessarily general phenomena. In using words like ‘please help
me, I am in trouble’, we are taking the general point of view that those in trouble, when requesting
assistance, ought to be helped. In Searle’s words,
Once … anyone is prepared to say ‘You have a reason to help me because I am in pain and
need help,’ then [one] is committed, in type-identical situations, to applying universal
quantifiers to the open sentence ‘y has a reason to help x because x is in pain and needs help,’
because the use of the general terms commits the speaker to the application of those terms to
situations that share the general features that the initial situation had. Language is by its very
nature general. (163-164)
In arguing for this point of view, Searle tries a new thought experiment involving something called
‘the Beast’. Arguably, this device hurts rather than helps his cause. The Beast is a hypothetical
robot, or creature, which we create by giving to a mere automaton the bare minimum psychological
conditions for rationality. “The first feature you have to put into your robot is consciousness … we
have to have a machine capable of perception, action, and desire. Furthermore, if [its actions] are to
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be rational actions, the robot has to engage in deliberation.” (143-144) In addition, you need to give
the robot, says Searle, the apparatus of ‘factitive states’ like beliefs (with their ‘downward direction
of fit’) and desires (with their ‘upward direction of fit’). In Chapter 2, ‘The Basic Structure of
Intentionality, Action, and Meaning’, Searle describes this latent structure in language use. Once we
have given the robot language, it then becomes strongly altruistic. Clearly, Searle’s thought
experiment here, unlike his more famous one, plays a vanishingly small rhetorical role. Its
usefulness, if any, consists in forcing him to lay out a list of the separable modules of mind
involved in language use and action. However, ‘the Beast’ does not assuage any worries we might
have about this structure.
By making his account of moral psychology so Kantian (although without all the “heavy-duty
metaphysics” (163)), Searle’s account falls prey to a worry that occupied Kant concerning his own
moral theory. A key part of Searle’s account of rationality is that it diverges from the so-called
‘Classical Account’ in that reasons for acting need not be based on desire. We make promises, says
Searle, simply because we recognize the reason for acting created by making a promise. However,
it seems at least plausible that the Beast never keeps promises, or does things for the sake of others.
Searle recognizes that he faces the same problem which Kant identifies near the end of Groundwork
of the Metaphysic of Morals. Kant says it is impossible to find out what interest man has in the
moral law, but assumes that there must be some in order for it to motivate. Presenting an alternative
account is the positive project found in Chapter 6, ‘How We Create Desire-Independent Reasons’.
Searle claims that rational agents can be motivated by reason alone – in his words, “The motivation
for performing the action is precisely the motivation for wanting to perform the action” (191).
Searle does think, however, that desire-independent reason can lead to a ‘secondary desire’ for
action. This terminology is somewhat confusing: for Searle, secondary desires seem to be desires
for necessary conditions for the satisfaction of primary desires. Searle seems to recognize that this
section of his book is both significant and problematic. In an appendix to this chapter, he attacks
what he calls the ‘internal’ approach according to which all motivations for actions must be desire-
based.
In addition to the mentioned topics, Searle offers, in Chapter 7 ‘Weakness of the Will’, an
explanation of how his account implies that akrasia is both possible and commonplace. His
explanation of a choice to do that which the self judges to be less than optimal is simply an appeal
to the gap. According to Searle, we only worry about the necessity of optimal choices when we
forget that there are no sufficient causal antecedents to rational (or irrational) choice. Akrasia is
simply a consequence of the gap between deliberation and action.
In short, Searle has written a book which will be of interest to philosophers with a variety of
research programs. In most cases he engages with at least some contemporary touchstones, such as
Korsgaard and Nagel on Kant, Davidson on akrasia. As mentioned, about a third of this book is on
issues of free will, and the reader may be frustrated with a lack of engagement with other authors.
Those looking for new thoughts by Searle on the philosophy of mind may be content with the few
scraps thrown their way. Fans of Searlian philosophy of language and related views on
intentionality will not find anything new there as such. In fact, in Chapter 2 Searle half-heartedly
suggests that the rehash of his basic views in this area may be a little much for the reader who
hasn’t read some of his other works first. In my opinion, the philosophy of language presented,
while somewhat dry, is accessible and sufficient for making sense of the rest of the book. The
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newest and most interesting part of this book is, arguably, Searle’s argument that the basic
normativity to be found in language use can ground a moral theory.
Darren Abramson
Indiana University - Bloomington
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